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A major theme at the 2003 LatCrit Conference was the call for a return to a
“materialist discourse” in LatCrit and Critical Race Theory.  Scholars like Professors
Daria Roithmayr and Richard Delgado contend that LatCrit and Critical Race theory
has focused too much on discursive theories of race and racial subordination without 
paying enough attention to the root causes of racism: material or economic factors
like “socioeconomic competition, immigration pressures, the search for profits,
changes in the labor pool, nativism.”2
This Essay will analyze the call for a return to a discourse on the material reality
of racism, and offer two ways to develop a materialist LatCrit and Critical Race
critique of dominant, inequality reinforcing legal narratives: by (1) critically
analyzing the narrative structure of dominant legal narratives, and by (2)
incorporating a critical geographical consciousness into LatCrit and Critical Race 
critique and discourse.  This Essay contends that any critical discourse must
explicitly recognize the multi-dimensional, multi-faceted, multi-causal reality of 
racism and racial subordination, and it must expose dominant legal narratives for
obscuring and obfuscating that reality.
I. THE NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY
The first step in constructing a multi-causal discourse on racism is to recognize
the way we use narrative to construct our social reality.3  As historian Hayden White
1Associate Professor, Appalachian School of Law.  I would like to thank Jackie Davis for 
her helpful comments in writing this essay.
2See generally Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id,
Ego, and Other Reformists Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L. J. 2279 (2001).
3See generally PATRICK EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE, 213 (University of Chicago Press 1998); PETER KOLLOCK & JODI
O’BRIEN, THE PRODUCTION OF REALITY: ESSAYS AND READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Pine
Forge Press 1994). 
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contends, “[n]arrative is a meta-code, a human universal on the basis of which trans-
cultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted.”4
Social reality can be defined as “the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdom, 
and shared understandings against a background of which legal and political 
discourse takes place.”5  We construct our social reality, our shared understanding of 
the world, by organizing and interpreting events according to narrative plots.6  The 
plot has been defined as the “conceptual structure which binds the events of a story 
together.”7  Thus, when a narrative is emplotted, the events and characters in the 
narrative “relate to one another and to some overarching structure, often in the 
context of an opposition or struggle.”8
To understand how narratives operate to construct social reality, we need to 
understand the difference between narratives that merely describe a sequence of 
events from emplotted narratives that organize a sequence of events into “an 
intelligible whole.”9 A narrative that merely describes a sequence of events tells the 
audience “what happened,” and that is all that it does.  Such a narrative is akin to a 
journalistic account of an event.  On the other hand, an emplotted narrative creates 
an intelligible whole by creating logical, causal connections between events, and by 
endowing the narrative with a “teleological or purposive movement.”10
In creating causal connections between events, emplotted narratives answer the 
“why” questions for us: Why did this particular event occur?  Why did this person 
act in a particular way?  As a literary theorist notes, “‘The king died, and then the 
queen died’ is a story.  ‘The king died and then the queen died of grief’ is a plot.  
Considering the death of the queen, ‘If it is in a story we say: “And then?”  However, 
“If it is in a plot we ask: Why?”11  That the queen died of grief over the king’s death 
is the “plot” of this simple narrative.  It is the causal link that connects two incidents 
separated in time and space: the death of the king, and the death of the queen; in 
other words, the plot turns a mere sequence of disconnected, random events into an 
intelligible whole where the king’s death caused the queen’s death, due to the grief 
she suffered.   
                                                                
4Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON
NARRATIVE 2 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1980). 
5Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionsts and Others:  A Plea For Narrative, 87 
MICH. L.R. 2411, 2412 (1989).   
6See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 112 (Harvard 
University Press 2000) (“[T]he very writs that defined causes of action at common law were 
rather like plot summaries of the founding narratives of various myth-like narrative genres.”). 
7J.M. Bernstein, Self-knowledge as Praxis: Narrative and Narration in Psychoanalysis, in
NARRATIVE IN CULTURE: THE USES OF STORYTELLING IN THE SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY, AND 
LITERATURE 55 (Cristopher Nash ed. 1990). 
8EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 3, at 200. 
9See Paul Riceour, Narrative Time, in ON NARRATIVE 167 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1980).   
10Bernstein, supra note 7, at 55. 
11WILLIAM LOWELL RANDALL, THE STORIES WE ARE: AN ESSAY IN SELF-CREATION 121 
(Univ. of Toronto Press 1995). 
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A.  The Fictionality of Emplotted Legal  Narratives 
Since emplotted narratives structure the way in which we comprehend the nature 
of reality, the question arises: to what extent do the stories we tell about society 
accurately represent external reality?  The premise of this Essay is that in many 
ways, narrative constructions of social reality often possess strong elements of 
imagination and invention.  In other words, just as a novel like A Christmas Carol is 
an invention of an author’s imagination, many emplotted legal narratives that purport 
to accurately describe “reality” are in many ways indistinguishable from such 
imaginary or invented narratives. 
What are the characteristics of a mostly invented or imagined narrative? A 
narrative is likely to be mostly a construct of the imagination if the narrative 
possesses a coherent, tightly structured plot.  A coherent causal or emplotted 
narrative is one that identifies a singular cause as the real or true cause of a set of 
events.  In telling a coherent emplotted narrative, therefore, a storyteller organizes 
and governs the intelligible whole of a story in a way to make other causal or 
structural possibilities seem entirely implausible, unlikely, untrue, and hence 
irrelevant.  Such a story is told in a way that any other causal or structural 
possibilities are excluded from consideration.   
Coherent narrative constructions of reality, however, achieve coherence only by 
denying and obfuscating the non-linear, multi-causal nature of external reality.  
“Real life” does not neatly move along the logical, linear path that a coherent 
narrative takes, because life/experience is extremely messy and complex, is always 
in flux, is always moving, and therefore life experiences do not lend themselves to 
being neatly summarized in a coherent narrative that purports to give us the essential 
“truth” about our past, our present, and our future.12  Narrative, in other words, tend 
to construct meaning from a set of events precisely to the extent that it moves further 
and further away from the dynamic details and flux of an ever shifting, ever 
changing external reality.  As White contends, “the value attached to narrativity in 
the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real events display the 
coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be 
imaginary.  The notion that sequences of real events possess the formal attributes of 
stories we tell about imaginary events could only have its origin in wishes, 
daydreams, reveries.”13
What are the characteristics of a mostly “invented” or fictional narrative?  One 
key inquiry to determine how well a story represents as accurately as possible what 
is taking place in the material world is to determine whether the story orients the 
reader towards higher levels of abstraction or towards lower levels of abstraction.14
A story that takes us up the ladder of abstraction takes us into the realm of the 
imaginary, while a story that takes us down the ladder of abstraction takes us into the 
realm of external reality.   
                                                                
12See generally WENDELL JOHNSON, PEOPLE IN QUANDARIES: THE SEMANTICS OF 
PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT (Harper & Row 1946). 
13HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL
REPRESENTATION 24 (John Hopkins Univ. Press 1987). 
14See generally S.I. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION (5th ed., Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich 1990) (1949).   
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II.  EXAMINING SPACE AND SPATIALITY TO DECONSTRUCT COHERENT 
EMPLOTTED LEGAL NARRATIVES
As argued above, coherent narrative constructions of social reality fail to 
realistically represent and correspond with external reality.  Specifically, this Essay 
contends that dominant legal narratives that rationalize existing racial inequality tend 
to be structured as coherent narratives that distort and obscure the concrete, material 
realities of racial subordination and inequality.  One effective method to deconstruct 
a dominant narrative is to expose and critique its spatial or geographic assumptions 
and premises. Specifically, one may deconstruct a legal story by exposing the 
choices made by the narrator regarding the spaces and places in which the narrative 
plot unfolds.   
Deconstructing the geographic assumptions in a legal narrative is one effective 
method of exposing the imaginary, invented elements of a legal narrative, because a 
narrative that organizes itself around a coherent plot often achieves its coherence by 
ignoring and obscuring the spatial or geographic dimensions of material reality.  As 
literary theorist John Berger argues, it is no longer possible to tell a coherent story 
unfolding sequentially over time, because in today’s postmodern material reality, the 
“simultaneity and extension of events and possibilities”15 continually disrupt the 
linear, temporal flow of a storyline.  Berger points to the increasing geographic 
interconnectedness of the postmodern world as a main cause for “our constantly 
having to take into account the simultaneity and extension of events and 
possibilities”: 
There are many reasons why this should be so: the range of modern means 
of communication: the scale of modern power: the degree of personal 
responsibility that must be accepted for all events all over the world: the 
fact that the world has become indivisible; the unevenness of economic 
development within that world; the scale of exploitation.  All these play a 
part.  Prophecy now involves a geographical rather than historical 
projection; it is space not time that hides consequences from us… Any 
contemporary narrative which ignores the urgency of this dimension is 
incomplete and acquires the oversimplified character of a fable.16
In this remarkable passage, Berger contends that that any narrative, legal or 
historical, that ignores the geographic “simultaneity and extension of events and 
possibilities” is a narrative that is likely more a construct of a storyteller’s 
imagination rather than an accurate as possible representation of the material world.  
Such a narrative actually hides from the audience the consequences and realities of 
the material world.
If dominant narratives obscures the way power flows through spaces and places, 
then critical scholars must employ counter-narratives that inquires into the way that 
spaces and place structure and organize hierarchical social relations.  As geographer 
Edward Soja argues, “[a]ll social relations become real and concrete, a part of our 
lived social existence, only when they are spatially 'inscribed'-- that is, concretely 
                                                                
15EDWARD W. SOJA, THIRDSPACE: JOURNEYS TO LOS ANGELES AND OTHER REAL-AND-
IMAGINED WORLDS 165 (Blackwell 1996) (quoting JOHN BERGER, SELECTED ESSAYS AND 
ARTICLES: THE LOOK OF THINGS 40 (Nikos Stangos ed., Viking Press 1974)).    
16Id. at 165-66.    
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represented-- in the social production of social space.  Social reality is not just 
coincidentally spatial, existing ‘in’ space, it is presuppositionally and ontologically 
spatial.  There is no unspatialized social reality.  There are no aspatial social 
processes.”17   In other words, the social is the spatial, and the spatial is the social.  
Accordingly, we cannot discuss social reality without understanding its 
spatial/geographic context. Thus, we must ask, what relationship exists between 
discourse and the organization and production of social space?   
Soja, therefore, calls for a “critical sensibility to the spatiality of social life, a 
practical theoretical consciousness that sees the lifeworld of being creatively located 
not only in the making of history but also in the construction of human geographies, 
the social production of space and the restless formation and reformation of 
geographical landscapes.”18  Such a critical geographical methodology views the 
“social being actively emplaced in space and time in an explicitly historical and 
geographical contextualization.”19
Moreover, in terms of the role that emplotted narratives play in the law, these 
narrative choices about which spaces and places to include and exclude in a narrative 
are choices that can help to mask and obscure power relations and power dynamics.  
As geographer Doreen Massey explains, “[s]ocial space can helpfully be understood 
as a social product, as constituted out of social relations, social interactions.  
Moreover, precisely because it is constituted out of social relations, spatiality is 
always and everywhere an expression and a medium of power.”20
Thus, critical legal theorists should explicitly theorize about space, because the 
organization and production of space is ultimately about social and political control 
and power, and therefore we cannot fully understand the phenomenon of power 
without understanding how power operates through and in spaces and places.  For 
example, not only must a theory on race relations ask how society has relied on 
historical and cultural norms to construct racial categories, but it must also ask how a 
particular society has used space to construct racial categories, and ask how the legal 
production and representation of space works to create and perpetuate racial 
oppression. 
By showing that a story achieves its meaning and persuasiveness by burying and 
discounting relevant facts, often by restricting and fixing the spatial scope of a 
narrative, critical scholars can deconstruct dominant legal narratives for delving into 
the realm of fantasy and imagination.  Moreover, by employing a geographic 
consciousness, critical scholars can begin to construct effective counter-narratives.  
As Doreen Massey contends, “An understanding of spatiality…entails the 
recognition that there is more than one story going on in the world.”21  Further, 
                                                                
17HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 28-29 (Blackwell 1991). 
18EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL
SOCIAL THEORY 11 (1989). 
19 Id.
20Doreen Massey, Space/Power, Identity/Difference: Tensions in the City, in THE
URBANIZATION OF INJUSTICE 104 (Andy Merrifield & Erik Swyngedouw eds., New York Univ. 
Press 1997).
21Doreen Massey, Spaces of Politics, in HUMAN GEOGRAPHY TODAY 281 (Doreen Massey, 
John Allen & Phillip Sarre eds. 1999). 
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“[s]pace/spatiality…is the sphere of the meeting up (or not) of multiple [narrative] 
trajectories, the sphere where they co-exist, affect each other, maybe come into 
conflict.”22  Similarly, Soja contends that in order to deconstruct hegemonic narrative 
representations of history, with its “compulsion toward linear, sequential, 
progressive, homogenizing conceptions of history,” it is necessary to “blast the 
embedded historical subject out of its temporal matrix and into a more…spatial 
contextualization.”23
Having argued for the importance of incorporating a geographic consciousness 
into critical analysis, this Essay suggests two ways of critically examining the spaces 
and places of a narrative:  (1) first, a critical analysis could examine the geographic 
scale or setting of a narrative.  This inquiry asks where does the story take place?  It 
also asks where else could it have taken place?   (2) Second, a critical analysis could 
examine the movement of people within the spaces and places in which the narrative 
unfolds.  This line of geographic inquiry assumes that where people are located has 
great significance and can tell us much about the way racism operates.  Thus, in 
examining any narrative, it will always be fruitful to ask questions such as: where are 
people located?  Where did they come from?  How long have they been there?  And 
how did they get there?  
III.  ANALYZING THE SPATIALITY OF RACISM IN RICHMOND V. J.A. CROSON CO.
This Section will apply a geographical critique of the legal narrative in Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality decision in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company.  In doing so, 
this Section will contend that systems of racial inequality rely significantly on the 
organization of space and place in order to perpetuate such systems.   
In Croson, the Supreme Court decided a case dealing with the constitutionality of 
state and local government race-conscious affirmative action programs.  The 
affirmative action set-aside at issue had been enacted in 1983 by the black majority 
controlled Richmond City Council.24  The City of Richmond enacted the set-aside 
based on evidence that showed that, between 1977 and 1982, while the city of 
Richmond consisted of a 50% black population, only .67% of the general 
construction contract dollars went to black owned businesses.  Under the set-aside, 
any contractor submitting a bid for a city contract was required to sub-contract 30% 
of the contract dollar value to one or more minority business enterprises (MBE).25
The set-aside defined an MBE as a business owned and controlled by a “black, 
Hispanic, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut.”  The set-aside did not place any 
geographic limitations on MBE eligibility; in other words, an MBE did not have to 
be located within the city of Richmond in order to participate in the program. 
J.A. Croson Company, a white-owned general contracting firm incorporated in 
Ohio, challenged the legality of the set-aside, after the City refused to accept 
Croson’s low bid on a construction contract, because it did not propose to 
subcontract 30% of the contract award to an MBE. Croson Company sued in 
Virginia state court, challenging the set-aside on state law and equal protection 
                                                                
22Id. at 283.  
23SOJA, supra note 15, at 173. 
24City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989). 
25Id. at 477. 
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grounds.26  The lawsuit was subsequently removed by the city of Richmond to 
federal district court.27  The federal district court ruled that the city had state law 
authority to enact the set-aside, and that the set-aside did not violate the equal 
protection clause.  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court reversed the district court’s 
ruling, holding that the set-aside violated the equal protection clause.  The Fourth 
Circuit, however, upheld that district court’s ruling on the state law issue of whether 
the city of Richmond had authority under state law to enact the set-aside.28
However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the 
constitutionality of the set-aside, holding that the program violated the equal 
protection clause.29  The Supreme Court then affirmed the Fourth Circuit decision 
and struck down the Richmond set-aside, holding that race-conscious set-aside 
violated the equal protection clause because it invidiously discriminated against 
white general contractors on the basis of their race. 
In striking down the set-aside, the Court held that state and local government 
action programs must be subject to strict scrutiny, and that Richmond’s program 
failed to meet strict scrutiny review because the Richmond City Council failed to 
prove that it had a compelling interest in enacting the program.  One important 
aspect of Justice O’Connor’s opinion was her conclusion that the Richmond City 
Council failed to show that past identified racial discrimination in the Richmond 
construction industry was the cause for the fact that 99% of the general contracting 
awards went to white owned businesses.30 She criticized the city council for relying 
on “an amorphous notion of societal discrimination” to justify the set-aside.  She 
concluded that in enacting the set-aside, the Richmond City Council was probably 
acting out of pure racial politics, acting out of a desire to harm white interests in 
order to benefit black interests.31
In dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the majority for taking such a cynical view 
of the Richmond City Council, and contended that the Court should have respected 
the City Council’s conclusion that racial discrimination existed in the Richmond 
construction industry.   He noted that, “[a]s much as any municipality in the United 
States, Richmond knows what racial discrimination is....  The members of the 
Richmond City Council have spent long years witnessing multifarious acts of 
discrimination, including, but not limited to, the deliberate diminution of black 
residents’ voting rights, resistance to school desegregation, and publicly sanctioned 
housing discrimination.”32
In response, Justice O’Connor asserted that the history of school desegregation in 
Richmond is irrelevant in defining the “scope of any injury to minority contractors in 
                                                                
26J. A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 182 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985) vacated by
478 U.S. 1016 (1989).     
27Id.  at 483. 
28J. A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond , 779 F.2d 181 (1985). 
29J. A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358 (1987), aff’d, 488 U.S. 469 
(1989).
30Croson, 488 U.S. at 498. 
31Id. at 502. 
32Id. at 529, 544. 
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Richmond or the necessary remedy.”33  She concluded, “[t]he set-aside seems to rest 
on an unsupported assumption that white prime contractors will not hire minority 
firms.”34
In Croson, Justice O’Connor constructed a narrative in which the black majority 
City Council acted out of racial politics and enacted an affirmative action program to 
benefit its black constituents based on an unsupported assumption that white 
contractors will not work with minority firms.  Was Justice O’Connor right?  Was 
the set-aside based on an unfounded assumption that whites will not hire blacks? 
This Essay contends that the assumption that whites will not hire blacks was a 
credible and realistic assumption, especially when the Richmond construction 
industry is put into geographic context.  Just as Justice Marshall contended, the 
history of school desegregation and white flight is indeed relevant to the exclusion of 
black contractors.  But, in merely reciting a laundry list of acts of racial 
discrimination, Justice Marshall failed to adequately connect the history of white 
resistance and flight from school desegregation to the exclusion of black contractors 
in the Richmond construction industry.35
The acts are deeply connected, but liberal legal theory cuts up and 
compartmentalizes the same phenomenon, racial subordination, and divides it into 
distinct legal issues that are then no longer considered “legally” relevant to each 
other.  Thus, according to the law, housing discrimination, electoral discrimination, 
and school segregation are legally distinct racial harms.  Legal categorization of 
these injuries removes them from their historical-spatial context.  As legal harms, 
plaintiffs must prove each separate harm, based on separate, analytically distinct 
“legal tests” to determine if they have proved their claim of constitutional injury.   
However, once these seemingly separate harms in placed their proper historical 
and spatial context, these separate legal harms are revealed as manifestations of a 
singular phenomenon: the systematic racial inequality experienced by black 
Richmond residents.  Ultimately, all three separate harms mentioned by Justice 
Marshall were harms structured and organized by geography, harms that worked 
together to contribute to the continuing spatial subordination of blacks.  Spatial 
subordination is the process by which space and place are organized in ways to 
create and reinforce the socioeconomic, cultural, and political power of a group. 
In the context of Croson, we can begin to see the connections between the 
various racial harms by examining the everyday spatial realities of whites and blacks 
in Richmond.  Examining the everyday spatial realities of life in Richmond requires 
asking the where questions: where do people in Richmond live?  Where do blacks 
live?  Where do whites live?  Where are the spaces and places that black and white 
people move and travel through?  Where do whites and blacks work?  Do they work 
together in the same places during the same time?  Where do whites and blacks 
socialize?   
 A historical geographical analysis of Richmond reveals that the seventies were 
the height of white flight from the Richmond central city.  Whites left for the 
surrounding suburbs in part to escape from a federal court school desegregation 
                                                                
33Id. at 471. 
34Id. at 502. 
35Id. at 544. 
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order.  As whites left the city of Richmond, the black percentage in Richmond grew, 
until they became the numerical majority.  Thus, the everyday spatial lives of whites 
and blacks in Richmond were characterized by a deep spatial separation, as whites 
moved away from the city of Richmond into the Richmond suburbs.  Whether whites 
migrated because of racial prejudice is not relevant to the ultimate effect: the 
construction of spatial segregation between white and black residents in the greater 
Richmond metropolitan area.     
The spatial separation between the races has great significance for the existence 
of racial disparities in the Richmond construction industry. If whites and blacks do 
not live and play together, then it is also likely that they do not work together, 
especially in an industry that depends heavily on personal networking for conducting 
business.  To understand the nature of racial disparities in public contracting, it is 
necessary to understand the relationship between private contracting and public 
contracting. The importance of personal networking is especially important in the 
private construction industry, because transactions between private contractors are 
basically unregulated.  There are no federal laws proscribing racial discrimination in 
private commercial transactions between two business firms.36   Moreover, the 
private construction industry does not use the sealed, competitive bidding process.  
Thus, while state law requires the City of Richmond to award contracts to the lowest 
responsible bidder, private contractors are under no obligation to do so. 
Accordingly, the general rule of thumb in the private sector is that “customers 
often choose their suppliers for non-economic reasons such as friendship, social, 
political, or ethnic ties, or for economic reasons prohibited in public procurement, 
such as returning a business favor, or wanting to develop an alternative supplier.”37
Moreover, “general contractors typically work with subcontractors with whom they 
are familiar because of the general contractor’s overall responsibility for the work.”38
Thus, general contractors forge business relationships and networks with 
subcontractors in the private construction transaction, which is relevant to public 
contracting because these same general contractors also bid on public contracts, and 
when they subcontract out public contracting work, they will do so based on 
relationships created and fostered in prior private construction dealings.  
Accordingly, there simply is no incentive, economic or otherwise, to seek 
unknown black contractors with whose work they are not familiar with.  As 
Professor Robert Suggs asserts, “[a] prime contractor has no obligation to select the 
subcontractor submitting the lowest bid, and nondiscriminatory reasons (such as 
previous working relationships, friendships, greater size or experience) readily 
explain a decision to stick with an established and known subcontractor.”39  Thus, in 
a racially segregated Richmond, where whites do not live with blacks, it is difficult 
for whites and blacks to become friends, neighbors, and business associates.  And 
this is why we need to closely examine the everyday lives of marginalized racial 
                                                                
36Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 
1257, 1263 (1991). 
37Id. at 1284-85. 
38Id.
39Robert E. Suggs, Rethinking Minority Business Development Strategies, 25 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 101, 115-16 (1990). 
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groups.  If, indeed, opportunity networks are forged in everyday life, in 
neighborhoods, at PTA meetings, at schools, at parks, at dinner parties, at birthday 
celebrations, at town meetings, then the continuing segregation of the races in 
Richmond actively denies blacks and other minorities access to this opportunity 
network. 
Thus, Justice O’Connor’s assertion that “the set-aside of subcontracting dollars 
seems to rest on the unsupported assumption that white prime contractors simply will 
not hire minority firms” is undermined once the set-aside is examined in the context 
of the everyday spatial lives of African Americans in Richmond.  The continuing 
racial segregation between whites and blacks strongly supports the assumption that 
white contractors will not hire minority firms for the simple reason that whites 
simply do not come into contact with blacks.  In fact, in Croson, Croson Company 
did not know any minority subcontractors, and therefore had to obtain a list of 
available minority businesses from several state and local agencies.  
The Croson case is a great example of what geographer Edward Soja means 
when he says that “space more than time hides consequences from us, and that 
geographical issues are more fundamental in contemporary politics and daily life 
than historical ones.”40 Croson shows us that whether whites and blacks socialize 
together has material consequences.  Racial subordination, therefore, is a multi-
dimensional, multi-causal, interconnected system that operates through all facets of 
our everyday lives, and examining the spatiality of everyday life can help to reveal 
connections that we otherwise would overlook.  
Now, based on a rather cursory examination into everyday spatial lives of blacks 
and whites in Richmond, let us reexamine the justifications and rationales for 
minority contracting set-asides.  The set-aside can be seen as another strategy, like 
school desegregation, to integrate American society, and to provide access for 
historically excluded groups to the opportunity structure.  The set-aside, therefore, 
was one tool available for the Richmond City Council to open up the closed 
opportunity structure in the Richmond construction industry.  By requiring general 
contractors to subcontract to minority firms,  the set-aside could have fostered 
working relationships and friendships between white and black firms, so that general 
contractors would subsequently consider hiring the minority firm in private 
construction contracts.  If successful, the set-aside could have helped minority firms 
gain access to networking opportunities, develop working relationships, and 
ultimately make set-asides unnecessary in the future.   
IV.  REVISITING THE NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF MATERIAL REALITY
Using a critical geography to critique dominant narrative constructions of social 
reality is a way to expose such narratives for failing to capture the everyday, subtle, 
hidden dimensions of racism and racial subordination.  This Essay will conclude 
with a few additional thoughts about the process of constructing social reality 
through narratives.  As argued earlier, a narrative achieves coherency when it creates 
a logically consistent, self-contained reality, a reality that is consistent with the 
narrative’s plot.41  A story with a self-contained reality produces self-referential 
                                                                
40SOJA, supra note 15, at 166. 
41See Robert Scholes, Language, Narrative, and Ant-Narrative, in ON NARRATIVE 207 
(W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1981) (“[I]n fiction the events may be said to be created by and with the 
text.”). 
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knowledge.  Such knowledge, in other words, legitimates or justifies itself ultimately 
by referring back to itself.  In such a coherent, self-referential narrative, there is no 
need for the reader to go outside the text of the story to seek answers to the questions 
raised in the case.  Hence, a coherent narrative provides closure, because it satisfies 
the reader’s desire for the answers. 
However, to the extent that a narrative creates a self-contained, self-referential 
reality, such a narrative produces a misleading and distorted mapping of material 
reality, of the world out there.  Such coherent legal narratives make sense to the 
audience/reader, because they are logically consistent, not because they have any 
relation to what is actually occurring in the material world.  Such a narrative 
succeeds in inviting “a reader to give primary attention to propositional connections 
of reference and internal connectedness (and hence set aside external connections of 
reference, verification, and so on).”42
Moreover, there is an epistemological assumption underlying the narrative 
construction of social reality.  The belief that coherent emplotted narratives 
accurately construct social reality is premised on an epistemology that assumes that 
there are immutable, objective truths about the world, and that those truths can be 
discovered.43  And according to this epistemology, once a “truth” is discovered, 
logically, there is no further need for inquiry into the matter, since an absolute, 
objective truth provides the conclusive answer to the question that initiated the 
search for that truth.  Such an epistemology, however, is a distorted mapping of 
material reality.  The “reality” is that knowledge is always contingent, partial, 
contextual, and is always subject to revision, modification and further inquiry.   
To be sure, we cannot totally escape from knowing the world through narratives.  
However, what we can do is to try to distinguish between legal narratives that lead us 
to concrete, empirical knowledge about material reality, and narratives that lead us to 
self-referential, abstract knowledge that is divorced from material reality.  Narratives 
that correspond to material reality will always raise new questions and further 
avenues for investigation and research.  They will direct us towards empirical 
questions rather than metaphysical questions.  Narratives that correspond to material 
reality will always produce new knowledge, new facts, new information, and 
sometimes, even new ways of seeing the world.  Narratives that do not correspond to 
material reality will tend to reinforce preexisting abstract beliefs and assumptions; in 
short, a self-contained narrative will tend to reinforce the truth and correctness of 
itself.
The call for critical materialist discourse, then, should be seen as call to produce 
narratives that deconstruct dominant legal narratives while simultaneously 
constructing new, liberating knowledge and new avenues for social transformation.   
                                                                
42Peter Lamarque, Narrative and Invention: The Limits of Fictionality, in NARRATIVE IN 
CULTURE: THE USES OF STORYTELLING IN THE SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY, AND LITERATURE 149 
(Cristopher Nash ed. 1990). 
43See Kim Scheppele, Legal Storytellng: Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2073, 2085 (1989). 
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